Has the traditional business cycle become obsolete? Not entirely, but major substantial changes in monetary policies and in the methods for calculating price measurement statistics, have altered the manner in which business cycles end. Business cycles consist of two components: an economic cycle and a financial cycle. Changes in policy and price measurement have shifted the pressures and excesses of the business cycle from the economy to the financial sector. In other words, high P/E ratios have taken the place of high CPI figures.
What Causes the Ups and Downs of a Business Cycles?
Some analysts and academics argue that the traditional business cycle characterized by increasing inflation and interest rates that eventually leads to an end of the cycle no longer exists. This perspective is somewhat supported when comparing business cycles before 1990 with those after.
For instance, since 1990, every business cycle has concluded with relatively low headline and core inflation. In contrast, from 1960 to 1990, business cycles ended with inflation rates of at least 5%, sometimes reaching double digits, with official rates significantly exceeding reported inflation.
However, to assess whether the traditional business cycle is now obsolete, it is crucial to first ascertain if the expansion and recession phases are influenced by government fiscal and monetary policies, developments in financial markets, or an exogenous shock. (Note: The business cycle that ended in 2020 was initiated by an unforeseen event, the pandemic, unlike the recessions of 2000 and 2007. However, in all three instances, both headline and core inflation were relatively low).
Essentially, significant technological advancements and globalization from the mid-1990s and beyond have decreased business cycle volatility, limiting or postponing price pressures that previously would have arisen during a typical business cycle. However, there are other factors at work as well.
During the mid-1990s, the approach to conducting monetary policy shifted from focusing on money and credit growth to targeting real interest rates. Most financial market analysts, myself included, did not initially see this shift in monetary policy as a major transformation. However, it turned into one when the BLS altered its method of measuring consumer prices in 1998.
In the late 1990s, the BLS stopped surveying the owner-occupied housing market to estimate owners' equivalent rent and began using data from the primary rental market, despite the fact that these two housing markets are influenced by different factors and frequently exhibit significantly different supply and demand patterns. At the same time, non-housing financing costs were removed from the CPI, continuing the previous exclusion of housing financing costs in the 1980s.
At that time, participants in the financial market did not consider these changes in price measurement to be significant. However, they were extremely important. During the housing bubble of the early 2000s, while housing prices experienced double-digit increases, the CPI indicated housing cost increases of only 2% to 4%. If the BLS had not implemented the measurement changes in the late 1990s, reported inflation would have been easily double what was reported.
(Note: The BLS excluded housing prices from the CPI in 1983, but continued to survey owner-occupied housing to estimate the implied rent for homeowners, maintaining a direct connection between housing inflation and increases in owners' rent. This connection was severed with the measurement changes in 1998).
The removal of non-mortgage interest costs also had a big impact on reported inflation. A joint research project by economists from Harvard and MIT found that the CPI from 2021 to 2023 would have been twice as high if consumer financing costs for were still included in price measurement.
Still, altering the methods for measuring prices had notable economic and financial impacts. Indeed, the revised CPI measure exhibits significantly less cyclicality, leading the Fed to aim for lower nominal and real interest rates than it would have if the BLS had not made these adjustments. This has led to considerably higher P/E ratios since 2000.
Economic downturns can stem from asset markets, as shown by the stock market crashes in 2000 and 2007, followed by recessions. The S&P 500 is trading at 22 times the projected earnings for 2025, and even higher compared to free cash flow projections. Other market indicators, such as the price-to-sales ratio, are also exceptionally high.
Therefore, the equity market is susceptible, particularly to an additional increase in market interest rates. Historically, the risk of recession increases when the yield on the 10-year Treasury surpasses the growth in Nominal GDP. According to current figures, there is merely a positive spread of 20 basis points with GDP outpacing the yield on the 10-year Treasury. However, current yields might still be too high given the lofty levels of the equity market.
However, the primary threat to the equity market and the economy lies in the fiscal strategies of the new administration. With the existing budget approaching $2 trillion, it is not financially viable to make the 2017 tax cuts permanent, as they are estimated to cost $4 trillion over the next decade, along with introducing further federal tax cuts. Even if the new Administration succeeds in reducing federal spending, it will not be significant enough to offset both past and new tax cuts, resulting in a budget deficit as large or larger than the current one.
More than three decades ago, President Bill Clinton shifted from his new economic agenda, which featured a middle-class tax cut, to a deficit-reduction strategy in response to the threat of increasing interest rates. At that time, the US was dealing with projected budget deficits ranging from $300 to $400 billion, compared to today's deficits exceeding $2 trillion.
Should the Trump economic team ignore the lessons from 2000, 2007, or even 1993, there is a genuine risk of a significant increase in interest rates. Market interest rates have previously impacted the fiscal strategies of a new president, and they have the potential to do so again, if not, the risk of financial chaos will increase.